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An Analysis of Insurable Interest Under
Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code
John M. Stockton'
The author undertakes a study and critique of the provisions of article
two of the Uniform Commercial Code concerning the insurable interest of
buyers and sellers in goods sold. The author concludes that while the Code
leaves the previous law of insurable interest unchanged in most situations,
it needlessly leaves many questions about insurable interest unanswered.
I. INTRODUCTION
The basic requisite of an insurable interest pervades all types of
insurance contracts.' The reason most commonly given to justify this
requirement is that in the absence of such an interest the agreement
is no more than a common wager.2 A second reason is that the absence
of an insurable interest might encourage the insured willfully to
destroy the property (or life) of the insured.
3
Despite universal recognition of its need, insurable interest is a
term of indefinite meaning. This is evidenced by the many opinions in
which courts have had difficulty in determining the existence of such
an interest.4 Definitions of the term necessarily are broad and largely
useless in the solution of cases.
The purpose of all property insurance is to indemnify the insured
for casualty to the insured property. If the insured has an insurable
interest there is some risk of loss to him in case of casualty to the
property, and this risk may be shifted to the insurer. If, on the other
hand, there is no risk of loss to shift, there is no insurable interest.
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, Wharton School of Finance and Commerce,
University of Pennsylvania.
1. For a discussion of insurable interest see 4 APPELMAN, INSUaANCE §§ 2121-25
(1941); PATrERSON, INSURANCE §§ 109-87 (2d ed. 1957); VANCE, INSURANCE §§ 28-34
(3d ed. 1951).
2. See, e.g., Howard Fire Ins. Co. v. Chase, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 509 (1867); Com-
monwealth Life Ins. Co. v. George, 248 Ala. 649, 28 So. 2d 910 (1947); Bennett v.
Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 100 Md. 337, 60 Atl. 99 (1905); Crossman v. American Ins. Co.,
198 Mich. 304, 164 N.W. 428 (1917); Cherokee Foundries v. Imperial Assur. Co., 188
Tenn. 349, 219 S.W.2d 203 (1949).
3. See PATrETSON, op. cit. supra note 1, at 111.
4. For example see the cases collected in Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 181 (1950), dealing
with the question of whether one has an insurable interest based on an invalid or
unenforceable contract.
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A. Bases of Insurable Interest in Property
Analysis of case law reveals that in property insurance cases courts
have found an insurable interest on the basis of one or more of the
following: a property right, a contract right, a potential legal liability,
a factual expectation of damage.5 Each of these categories represents
a special relationship between the insured and the insured property
which the courts recognize as creating risk of loss to the insured if
the property is damaged or destroyed.
1. Property Right.-A property right of the insured in the insured
property is one of the commonest and clearest bases upon which courts
have recognized an insurable interest. Such a right includes not only
a right to the property based on legal or equitable title,6 but also the
interest one has in property by his right to possession,7 or by possession
alone, even though wrongful.8 It also embraces the insurable interest
of one having a specific lien on property.9 The distinctive characteris-
tic of an insurable interest based on a property right is that the insured
has some right, either legal or equitable, in the res.
2. Contract Rights.-A second kind of insurable interest has been
recognized as arising out of contract rights. If the contract gives a
party in rem rights in the property he has an insurable interest on the
basis of the property right alone as discussed above. In some in-
stances, however, when the contract has not given the insured any
right in the res, he has been recognized as having an insurable interest
on the basis of the contract right alone.10
5. See generally PATTERSON, op. cit. supra note 1, at 111-23; Harnett & Thornton,
Insurable Interest in Property: A Socio-Economic Reevaluation of a Legal Concept,
48 CoLum. L. RFv. 1162, 1165-75 (1948); Patterson & McIntyre, Unsecured Creditor's
Insurance, 31 CoLum. L. REv. 212, 220-26 (1931).
6. See, e.g., Milwaukee Mechanics' Ins. Co. v. Rhea, 123 Fed. 9 (6th Cir. 1903);
Farmer's Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Hodges, 142 Ark. 577, 219 S.W. 13 (1920); Cum-
mings v. Dirigio Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 112 Me. 379, 92 Ad. 298 (1914); Lowenstein
v. Queen Ins. Co., 227 Mo. 100, 127 S.W. 72 (1910); Dunning v. Firemen's Ins. Co.,
194 S.C. 98, 8 S.E.2d 318 (1940); Thompson v. Gearheart, 137 Va. 427, 119 S.E. 67
(1923); Scott v. Dixie Fire Ins. Co., 70 W. Va. 533, 74 S.E. 659 (1912).
7. See, e.g., Globe v. Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. Rose, 91 F.2d 635 (8th Cir. 1937),
cert. denied, 302 U.S. 749 (1937); Farmers' and Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Mickel, 72
Neb. 122, 100 N.W. 130 (1904); Baird v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 178 Tenn.
653, 162 S.W.2d 384 (1942).
8. See, e.g., Barnett v. London Assur. Corp., 138 Wash. 673, 24 Pac. 3 (1926)
(good faith purchaser of stolen automobile). Contra, Henssen v. Iowa Auto. Ins. Co,,
195 Iowa 141, 190 N.W. 150 (1922).
9. See, e.g., Fageol Truck & Coach Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 18. Cal. 2d 731, 117
P.2d 661 (1941) (conditional seller of goods); Hayward Lumber & Inv. Co. v. Lyders,
139 Cal. App. 517, 34 P.2d 805 (1934) (mechanics lien); First Nat'l Bank v. Newark
Fire Ins. Co., 118 Pa. Super. 582, 180 Ad. 163 (1935) (judgment creditor with
statutory lien).
10. In Fire Ins. Ass'n, Ltd. v. Merchants' & Miners' Transp. Co., 66 Md. 339, 7
Atl. 905 (1887), a transportation company carried cotton under a bill of lading
exempting it from liability from loss by fire. The court held that the company had
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3. Potential Legal Liability.-The possible legal liability of the
insured has been another basis for an insurable interest in property.
In most cases in which this basis has been recognized it would have
been possible to tie the insurable interest to one of the concepts al-
ready discussed. For example, it is recognized that a contractor who
has contracted to construct a building has an insurable interest in
the building while it is under construction." His insurable interest,
even though he has no in rem right in the property, may be rested
either on the potential legal liability if the building is destroyed be-
fore the completion date, or on the theory that damage or destruction
to the building before completion would impair his rights under the
construction contract.'2 Similarly, a bailee of goods under a mutual
benefit bailment would have an insurable interest based either on
his potential legal liability should the goods be lost, damaged, or
destroyed because of his failure to exercise proper care regarding
their custody, or on his in rem right in the goods based on possession
or right to possession.
13
4. Factual Expectation of Damage.-A fourth basis, the broadest
and most inclusive, has been recognized in some jurisdictions. In
some instances it has been used to justify an insurable interest when
none could be based on any of the other three concepts. This fourth
concept rests on the very general theory that one should have an
insurable interest in any property which if lost, damaged or destroyed,
might result in economic disadvantage to him.' 4
an insurable interest in the cotton against loss by fire on the basis of the freight which
it expected to earn by transporting the goods. In Planters' & Merchants' Ins. Co., 93
Ala. 255, 9 So. 268 (1890), an insured was held to have an insurable interest against
fire in a house which he had contracted to move, to the extent of the compensation
he was to have earned under the contract.
11. See, e.g., National Fire Ins. Co. v. Kinney, 224 Ala. 586, 141 So. 350 (1932).
12. In King v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 195 Mo. 290, 92 S.W. 892 (1906), the court held
that a builder had an insurable interest even though he had completed the building
and had been paid. His insurable interest was based on his legal liability to the
owner to rebuild the building if it were destroyed by fire.
13. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Baltimore Warehouse Co., 93 U.S. 527 (1876); In re
Podolsky, 15 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1940); Gillespie v. Federal Compress & Warehouse
Co., 265 S.W.2d 21 (Tenn. App. 1953).
14. For example the question has arisen as to whether a husband who is a mere
tenant at sufferance on his wife's property has an insurable interest in the property. At
least one court has recognized that the husband has an insurable interest on the basis
of a factual expectation of loss as discussed in the text. See Kludt v. German Mut.
Fire Ins. Co., 152 Wis. 637, 140 N.W. 321 (1913). Most courts, however, have held
that the husband does not have an insurable interest. See, e.g., Traders' Ins. Co. v.
Newman, 120 Ind. 554, 22 N.E. 428 (1889); LaFont v. Home Ins. Co., 193 Mo. App.
543, 182 S.W. 1029 (1916); Bassett v. Farmers' & Merchants' Ins. Co., 85 Neb. 85,
122 N.W. 703 (1909).
For a discussion of the factual expectation of loss concept see Harnett & Thornton,
supra note 5, at 1171-75 and cases cited therein.
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B. Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code
Case law relating to insurable interest in contracts for the sale of
goods is fragmentary. Legal literature dealing specifically and ex-
clusively with these same problems is scarce. Most treatises on
insurance deal with insurable interest in property in very general
terms and usually without differentiating problems of insurable
interest in the sale of real property from those involved in the sale
of goods.' 5 In many instances the problems involved in these two
types of transactions are quite different. 16 It is to the credit of the
drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter referred to as
the Code] that they saw fit to include a section dealing specifically
with insurable interest in goods which are the subject matter of a sales
contract.'
7
The Code provides that the seller retains an insurable interest in the
goods as long as he has title to or any security interest in them,18 and
that the buyer has an insurable interest upon identification of the
goods to the contract.19 The drafters make it clear that the adoption
of the Code will not in any way impair an insurable interest recognized
by any other rule of law in the jurisdiction2 0 This means that the
insurable interest of the parties to a sales contract will never be
narrower than recognized by the specific provisions of the Code;
however, it may be broader.
II. THE SELLER'S INSUIABLE INTEREST
A. Based on Title
In contracts for the sale of goods the traditional rationale for recog-
nizing insurable interest based on title is that it is usually the owner
15. For example, see generally PATTERSON, op. cit. supra note 1, at 109-52; VANCE,
op. cit. supra note 1, § 29.
16. For example, a contract to sell real property gives the buyer equitable title to
the property. At common law and under the Uniform Sales Act a contract to sell
goods, unless it is sufficient to give legal title, ordinarily would not give the buyer a
property interest in the goods.
Contracts to sell real estate not identified at the time the contract is made would
be most unusual. However, contracts to sell unidentified goods are common.
17. UNIwopi ConmumciAL CoDE § 2-501 [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.]. As of
March 6, 1964, the Code had been adopted by the following thirty jurisdictions:
Alaska, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Georgia, Illinois,
Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
Wyoming.
18. U.C.C. § 2-501(2).
19. U.C.C. § 2-501(1).
20. U.C.C. § 2-501(3). This subsection was not placed in the 1952 draft of the
code. It was placed in all subsequent drafts, evidently, to meet the criticism of the
New York Law Revision Commission. See 1 REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMNIS-
slON FOR 1955: Study of the Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2, N. Y. Leg. Doc.
65(c), at 335 (1955).
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who bears the loss if there is casualty to the property.21 Under the
Code this is not necessarily true. In fact, title and risk of loss are
expressly divorced.22 It is not clear, therefore, why the drafters did not
specifically recognize insurable interest based on risk of loss. Analysis
of the provisions of the Code reveals that while in some situations
title and risk of loss pass to the buyer at the same time, in other situa-
tions they do not. Risk of loss usually is borne by the seller as long
as he is in possession of the goods, even though title may already
have passed.
Under the Code title passes from the seller to the buyer when the
parties agree that it shall pass,2 except that title to goods cannot pass
before they have been identified to the contract.2 4 The question of
when risk of loss passes is also subject to an agreement between the
parties.2 If they agree on the matter, their intention will control. In
cases in which the parties have not otherwise explicitly agreed the
Code sets out detailed rules by which to determine when title passes.
2 6
Similar rules are set out to determine who bears the risk of loss.
27 It
must be emphasized again, however, that the two problems are dealt
with separately in the Code. Several short factual situations will
serve to illustrate the operation of these rules as they relate to the
seller's insurable interest in the goods.
Case 1. Under the contract the seller is to ship the goods to the
buyer but is not required to deliver them at destination. Here neither
title nor risk of loss passes to the buyer until the goods are shipped
and the seller has an insurable interest, at least, until that time.
28
Case 2. The contract not only requires the seller to ship the goods
but also obligates him to deliver them at destination. Here title and
risk of loss do not pass until the goods are tendered by the seller at
their destination. 9 Therefore, he retains an insurable interest at least
until that time.
Case 3. The contract calls for delivery of documents of title with-
out moving the goods. Title passes when these documents are
delivered, regardless of whether the documents are negotiable.30 Risk
21. See generally, VOLD, SALES § 38 & n.1 (2d ed. 1959).
22. U.C.C. § 2-509, comment 1. Section 2-401 deals with passing of title and §§
2-509 and 2-510 deal with risk of loss.
23. U.C.C. § 2-401(2) and (3).
24. U.C.C. § 2-401(1).
25. U.C.C. § 2-509(4), comment 5.
26. U.C.C. § 2-401. The drafters provide that the provisions of this section shall
apply "unless otherwise explicitly agreed." Under § 18 of the Uniform Sales Act the
implied intent of the parties may be used to vary the effect of the rules in § 19.
27. U.C.C. § 2-509.
28. U.C.C. §§ 2-401(2) (a), 2-509(1) (a).
29. U.C.C. §§ 2-401(1) (b), 2-509(1)(b).
30. U.C.C. § 2-401(3)(a).
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of loss in this case requires further elaboration. If the goods are in
possession of a bailee and delivery is to be made by the delivery of a
negotiable document of title, risk of loss passes to the buyer as soon
as he receives this document.31 On the other hand, if delivery is made
by means of a non-negotiable document of tide, risk of loss remains on
the seller even after the buyer receives the document and until the
buyer has had a reasonable time to obtain the bailee's acknowledg-
ment of the transfer.As This means that during this interim period of
time the buyer has title but the seller has the risk of loss. Of course,
the seller may have expressly reserved a security interest in the goods,
or he may have such an interest based on his right to stop delivery;
33
otherwise, during this time the seller's insurable interest is dependent
upon other rules of law in the jurisdiction.34
Case 4. The contract calls for delivery without moving the goods
and without the delivery of documents of title. If the goods are
already identified at the time the contract is made title passes at the
time of contracting.35 If the goods are not identified at the time the
contract is made the Code does not state specifically when title passes.
It implies, however, that title passes as soon as goods are marked
or otherwise designated as goods to which the contract refers.36 The
time when risk of loss passes in this situation requires further com-
ment. If the seller is a merchant and the goods are in his possession
risk of loss does not pass until the buyer receives the goods.37 Other-
wise, the risk of loss passes to the buyer when delivery is tendered.
Thus the seller bears the risk of loss even though title has passed. If
he has not expressly reserved a security interest his insurable interest
would again be dependent upon other rules of law, unless he has a
31. U.C.C. § 2-509(2) (a).
32. U.C.C. § 2-509((2)(c).
33. U.C.C. § 2-705. The seller's security interest based on the right to stop delivery
is discussed below.
34. U.C.C. § 2-501(3).
35. U.C.C. § 2-401(3)(b).
36. U.C.C. § 2-401, comment 2, provides: "Future goods cannot be the subject of
a present sale. Before title can pass the goods must be identified in the manner set
forth in Section 2-501 .... ." Section 2-501(b) provides: "In the absence of explicit
agreement identification occurs if the contract is for the sale of future goods other
than those described in paragraph (c) [crops and unborn young of animals], when
goods are shipped, marked or otherwise designated by the seller as goods to which
the contract refers."
37. U.C.C. § 2-509(3). Comment 3 to this section states: "The underlying theory
of this rule is that a merchant who is to make physical delivery at his own place
continues meanwhile to control the goods and can be expected to insure his interest
in them. The buyer, on the other hand, has no control of the goods and it is
extremely unlikely that he will carry insurance on goods not yet in his possession."
See U.C.C. § 2-104(1) and comments for definition of the term "merchant."
38. U.C.C. § 2-509(3). "Tender of delivery requires that the seller put and hold
conforming goods at the buyer's disposition and give the buyer any notification
reasonably necessary to enable him to take delivery .... " U.C.C. § 2-503(1),
[VOL. 17
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security interest based on the right to withhold delivery.19 If in this
same fact situation the goods are in the possession of a bailee,
whether the seller is a merchant or non-merchant, risk of loss does
not pass to the buyer until the bailee acknowledges the buyer's right
to the goods.40 As in Case 3 where delivery of goods in possession of
a bailee is made by delivery of a non-negotiable document of title
this is a situation in which the seller may have risk of loss without
having either title or possession. The same discussion regarding his
insurable interest is also relevant here.
All that has been said in the above cases regarding risk of loss
assumes that neither party has breached the contract. The Code pro-
vides that if the seller tenders or delivers goods which are non-
conforming, to the extent that the buyer has a right to reject them,
risk of loss remains on the seller until either the non-conformity is
corrected or the buyer accepts the goods. 41 Whether the buyer right-
fully or wrongfully rejects the goods, however, title revests in the
seller.42
An interesting problem arises when the buyer accepts non-conform-
ing goods and then rightfully revokes the acceptance.4 3 The Code
provides that in such a case while title revests in the seller,4 risk of
loss is placed on the seller only to the extent that there is any
deficiency in the buyer's effective insurance coverage.4 5
B. Based on a Security Interest
The Code gives the seller an insurable interest in the goods so long
as he retains a security interest in them even though title and risk of
loss have passed to the buyer.46 A security interest gives the seller an
in rem right in the goods. The effect of such an interest is to give
the seller recourse against the goods in order to secure the perform-
39. U.C.C. §§ 2-702(1), 2-703(a). The security interest of the seller based on
the right to withhold delivery is discussed below.
40. U.C.C. § 2-509(b). Comment 4 to this section explains that such acknowl-
edgment completes "delivery."
41. U.C.C. § 2-510(1).
42. U.C.C. § 2-401(4).
43. Care should be taken to distinguish revocation of acceptance from rejection.
Rejection is simply refusal to accept the goods. Under the Code revocation is roughly
analagous to rescission at common law. It is a means of avoiding the sale and revesting
title in the seller despite acceptance of the goods, and gives the buyer the same
rights as if he had originally rejected the goods. See U.C.C. §§ 2-601, -602, -606,
and -608.
44. U.C.C. § 2-401(4).
45. U.C.C. § 2-510(2). To balance this provision § 2-510(3) provides: "Where
the buyer as to conforming goods already identified to the contract for sale repudiates
or is otherwise in breach before risk of their loss has passed to him, the seller may
to the extent of any deficiency in his effective insurance coverage treat the risk of
loss as resting on the buyer for a commercially reasonable time."
46. U.C.C. § 2-501(2).
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ance of one or more of the buyer's duties, usually payment of the
purchase price. Casualty to the goods could seriously impair not only
his ability to collect the price but also the marketability of his chose
in action.
1. Security Interest by Reservation.-The most common method for
the creation of a security interest is for the seller to reserve title to the
goods even though they have already been delivered to the buyer.
The Code provides that retention of title under such circumstances is
limited in effect to a reservation of a security interest.47 Retention of
title is usually accomplished by making the sale under a conditional
sales contract or some similar legal device.
A seller may also reserve a security interest under a bill of lading.
For example, it is provided in the Code that every shipment of identi-
fied goods by the seller under a negotiable bill of lading reserves a
security interest in him whether the bill of lading calls for delivery to
the order of the seller, the buyer, or some other party.48 The seller has
a security interest in such a case even though title may have passed to
the buyer.49 The reason for the existence of a security interest here is
that so long as the seller retains control of the bill of lading he retains
control of the goods. The carrier is not required to surrender the
goods except to the holder of the bill of lading who must surrender
the bill for cancellation or notation (in case of partial deliveries). 5
In fact, delivery to one who is not the holder could render the carrier
liable to an injured party.51 The seller by naming himself, or his
nominee, as consignee may also reserve a security interest in identi-
fied goods if they are shipped under a non-negotiable bill of lading.
52
If, however, the buyer is named as consignee in such a document, the
seller does not after shipment retain a security interest under the bill
of lading, except in the case of a conditional delivery under section
2-507(2), even though he retains possession of the bill.5 3 This is
because a carrier is obligated under a non-negotiable bill of lading
to deliver the goods to the named consignee who properly identifies
himself, even though the bill of lading is not presented.
54
The Code makes it clear that any reservation of a security interest
by the seller by the form of the bill of lading is not rendered invalid
by the sole fact that it may constitute a breach of contract .5
47. U.C.C. § 2-401(1).
48. U.C.C. § 2-505(1) (a) and comment 2.
49. U.C.C. § 2-505, comment 1.
50. U.C.C. § 7-403.
51. U.C.C. § 7-403 and comments.
52. U.C.C. § 2-505(1) (b) and comment 3.
53. U.C.C. § 2-505(1) (b) and comment 4.
54. U.C.C. § 2-505, comment 4.
55. U.C.C. § 2-505(2).
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Special problems arise in those cases in which the contract provides
that payment is to be made upon delivery of the goods or documents
of title, but the seller gives the buyer possession of the goods without
either receiving payment or expressly reserving title. It has been
held that despite delivery of possession if the cash on delivery term
has not been waived, the seller may repossess the goods provided the
buyer does not pay for them.56 It has been held that delivery of
possession alone in expectation of immediate payment is not of itself
a waiver of the condition.57 What constitutes a waiver in doubtful
cases has been held to be a question of fact to be determined from all
of the circumstances.
5 8
The Code deals with this special problem by stating: "Where pay-
ment is due and demanded on the delivery to the buyer of goods or
documents of title, his right as against the seller to retain or dispose of
them is conditional upon his making the payment due." 9 The Code
indicates that if the delivery is conditional under this section the
seller has a security interest in the goods until the purchase price is
paid.60 Evidently, the right of the seller to repossess the goods, and
hence a security interest in them, is dependent upon his "demanding
payment upon delivery." Do the drafters mean an "express" demand?
If not, it could be argued that in every case of this sort there is at
least an implied demand for payment unless the term is waived.
2. Security Interest by Operation of Law.-Even in the absence of
the reservation of a security interest such an interest may arise by
operation of law in the course of a sales transaction.6' The provisions
of the Code give very little assistance in determining when the seller
has a security interest by operation of law. The definition given the
term "security interest" is of little assistance.6 The most enlightening
language in this connection is found in a comment to a section in
article 9.6 This comment recognizes that whether or not the seller
56. For a collection of cases see 2 WiLLisToN, SALs § 343 n.17 (rev. ed. 1948).
Such transactions are commonly called "cash sales."
57. For a collection of cases see VOLD, op. cit. supra note 21, § 29 nn.85-94.
58. See, e.g., U.S. v. Lutz, 142 F.2d 985 (3d Cir. 1944): Lehmann v. Peoples
Furniture Co., 42 Okla. 761, 142 Pac. 986 (1914).
59. U.C.C. § 2-507(2).
60. U.C.C. § 2-504(1)(b) and comment 4.
61. "Security is an interest in chattels, in land, or in the obligation of a third party.
A security interest must be the result of a transaction that gives recourse against a
particular chattel or land or against a third party on an obligation. The purpose of
security is generally to secure the repayment of money, but it may also secure the
performance of any duty." REsTATEmENT, SEcurY, scope note (1941).
A security interest which arises by operation of law is one created by a rule of
statutory or common law because of the status of the parties, and is not dependent
for its existence upon the consent of the parties. See U.C.C. § 9-102 and comment 1.
62. "'Security interest' means an interest in personal property or fixtures which
secures payment or performance of an obligation." U.C.C. § 1-102(37).
63. U.C.C. § 9-113, comment 1.
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reserves a security interest his right of stoppage and resale give him
rights in the goods "similar to those of a secured party." It seems fairly
clear from what the drafters have said and mainly from what they
have not said that they have not intended to abrogate any of the
common law rules as to when a seller has a security interest in goods
even though he has not reserved such an interest.
It is recognized at common law that the seller's possessory lien and
his right to stop goods in transit give him a security interest in them.6
These same two rights are recognized, adopted and expanded under
the Code.
(a) Seller's Right to Withhold Possession.-Section 2-702(1) allows
the seller to refuse to deliver the goods upon discovery of the buyer's
insolvency, except for cash. This provision in effect allows the seller
to cancel any credit terms if the buyer becomes insolvent before the
goods are delivered.6 5 Another section gives the seller the right to
withhold possession if the buyer wrongfully refuses to pay for the
goods or otherwise breaches the contract.6 This latter section would
include the situation in which the seller cancels a credit term upon the
buyer's insolvency while the purchase price remains unpaid.67
(b) Seller's Right of Stoppage.-Section 2-705 of the Code allows
a seller who has not been paid all of the purchase price to stop delivery
of goods in the possession of a carrier or other bailee when he
discovers that the buyer is insolvent. This same section also allows
the seller to stop delivery of carload, truckload, planeload or larger
shipments of express or freight in the possession of a carrier or other
bailee if the buyer repudiates or fails to make a payment or in any
other way breaches the contract in such a way as to have justified the
seller in withholding possession under the circumstances discussed
above. The right of the seller to stop delivery under this section
continues until any one of the following occurs:
64. See, e.g., In re Charles T. Stork & Co., 271 Fed. 279 (2d Cir. 1921); McElwee
v. Metropolitan Lumber Co., 69 Fed. 302 (6th Cir. 1895); Memphis & L.R.R. v. Freed,
38 Ark. 614 (1862); Perrine v. Barnard, 142 Ind. 448, 41 N.E. 820 (1896); Johnson
v. Eveleth, 93 Me. 306, 45 AtI. 35 (1899); Arnold v. Delanco, 58 Mass. (4 Cush.) 33
(1849); Rowley v. Bigelow, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 307 (1832); Burke v. Dunn, 117
Mich. 430, 75 N.W. 931 (1898); Conrad v. Fisher, 37 Mo. App. 352 (1889); Bohn
Mfg. Co. v. Hynes, 83 Wis. 388, 53 N.W. 684 (1892); RESTATEMENT, SECtIMIT §
61 (1941).
The Uniform Sales Act adopts the common law rules regarding the seller's possessory
lien and his right to stop goods in transit. Uniform Sales Act §§ 53-59.
65. This is also the rule at common law. See, e.g., McElwee v. Metropolitan Lumber
Co., supra note 64; Crummey v. Raudenbush, 55 Minn. 426, 56 N.W. 1113 (1893).
66. U.C.C. § 2-703(a).
67. This is because cancellation of the credit term would make the price due im-
mediately. Section 2-703(a) allows the seller to withhold delivery of goods if the
buyer fails to make a payment due on or before delivery.
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(1) The goods are received by the buyer.68
(2) Acknowledgment to the buyer by any bailee other than a
carrier that the goods are being held for the buyer.
6 9
(3) Acknowledgment by a carrier to the buyer, either by reship-
ment or acting as a warehouseman, that the goods are being
held for the buyer.
70
(4) A negotiable document of title covering the goods is negoti-
ated to the buyer.
71
Until one of these events occurs the seller has a security interest and,
therefore, an insurable interest in the goods.
(c) Seller's Right of Reclamation.-Even though the goods have
been delivered to the buyer without the reservation of a security
interest, the Code allows the seller to reclaim the goods from a buyer
who has received them on credit while insolvent, provided the
seller demands their return within ten days after the buyer receives
them.72 This ten day limitation does not apply, however, if the buyer
has made a misrepresentation of solvency in writing to the seller
within three months before delivery is made.73 The basis of the ten
day rule is that receipt of goods on credit by an insolvent buyer is a
misrepresentation of solvency and therefore a fraud on the seller.74
A question can be raised as to whether this right of reclamation of
itself gives a seller who delivers goods on credit a security interest in
the goods for at least ten days after they have been received by the
buyer against the possibility that the buyer was insolvent when he
received the goods. The Code gives no specific answer to this question.
68. U.C.C. § 2-705(2) (a).
69. U.C.C. § 2-705(2)(b).
70. U.C.C. § 2-705(2)(c).
71. U.C.C. § 2-705(2) (d).
72. U.C.C. § 2-702(2).
73. Ibid.
74. U.C.C. § 2-702, comment 2.
This section evidently attempts to resolve a problem which has caused difficulty at
common law. It seems clear that if a buyer receives goods with no intention of paying
for them, the transaction is fraudulent and may be rescinded by the seller. See, e.g.,
Maxwell v. Brown Shoe Co., 114 Ala. 304, 21 So. 1009 (1896); Nashville Grain &
Feed Co. v. American Co-op Ass'n, 203 Ky. 458, 262 S.W. 634 (1924). A difficult
problem is presented when a buyer receives goods under a transaction of sale, knowing
himself to be insolvent and knowing that the seller is ignorant of this fact. Is the
buyer's conduct fraudulent? Some courts have held that if the buyer knows his
situation to be desperate his conduct indicates an intention not to pay, and the seller
may rescind on the basis of fraud. See, e.g., California Conserving Co. v. D'Avanzo,
62 F.2d 528 (2d Cir. 1933). Other courts have held, however, that mere failure of
the buyer to disclose his "technically" insolvent condition does not of itself constitute




Several provisions in article 9 indicate, however, that it does not.75 The
question of whether the seller should have an insurable interest
based solely on the fact that the purchase price has not been paid
is discussed below.
C. Should an Unsecured Seller Have an Insurable Interest?
The question of whether a seller who has not been paid the entire
purchase price should have an insurable interest in goods delivered
to the buyer although he has not reserved a security interest is en-
compassed in the broader question of whether an unsecured creditor
should have an insurable interest in his debtor's property. As some
writers have pointed out, the destruction of the debtor's property,
especially his stock in trade, machinery and equipment, will adversely
affect his earning capacity and his ability to pay his debts.76 In addi-
tion, destruction of any of his property, especially that on which he
has no insurance, reduces the assets available to be levied on if the
creditor reduces his claim to judgment. These same things hold true
regarding goods delivered to a buyer under a sales contract.
Case law as to whether an unsecured creditor has an insurable
interest in his debtor's property is not settled."7 There is little authority
on the more specific question of an unsecured seller's insurable
interest in goods sold and delivered under a sales contract.78 The
Uniform Commercial Code does not deal specifically with the
problem. Instead the question is left up to other rules of law in the
jurisdiction.7
9
75. Section 9-102(2) and comment I indicate that except as provided in § 9-310,
article 9 applies only to consensual security interests. Section 9-113(a) provides that
a security interest arising solely under article 2 is subject to the provisions of article 9
except that no security agreement is necessary to make the security interest enforceable
"so long as the debtor does not have or does not lawfully obtain possession of the
goods." (Emphasis added.) Comment 3 to § 9-113 states in part: "A secured party
who wishes to retain a security interest after the debtor lawfully obtains possession
must comply fully with all the provisions of this article ......
The provisions seem to indicate that the seller's right of reclamation alone does not
give him a security interest. Rather, as the buyer is in possession, the existence of a
security interest is dependent upon an agreement between the parties that the seller
has retained such an interest.
76. See Patterson & McIntyre, Unsecured Creditor's Insurance, 31 CoLmri. L. REV.
212, 214-16 (1931).
77. See Harnett & Thornton, Insurable Interest in Property: A Socio-Economic
Reevaluation of a Legal Concept, 48 CoLum. L. REv. 1162, 1169 (1948) and cases
cited therein; Patterson & McIntyre, supra note 76, at 218-19 and cases cited therein.
78. One of the few cases in which this problem was considered is Perryman Burns
Coal Co. v. Northwestern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 130 Misc. 396, 223 N.Y.S. 559
(1927). In that case the seller was to deliver coal to the buyer by loading it on
barges belonging to the buyer. The court held that title and risk of loss passed to
the buyer after delivery; therefore, the seller had no further interest in or duty with
respect to the coal and no insurable interest.
79. U.C.C. § 2-501 (3).
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There seems to be little reason why it should not be recognized that
the seller has an insurable interest in the goods under these circum-
stances. An argument basing such an interest on the property right
concept discussed above can be advanced. There are many circum-
stances under which it is recognized that a buyer gets only a voidable
title as the result of a sales transaction. In such a case, assuming the
goods have not been resold to an innocent party, the seller may
rescind the sale and recover the property.80 In short, in every sales
contract there is the possibility that even though the goods have
been delivered to the buyer without reservation of a security interest
the seller will be able to regain possession of them in case the buyer's
title is voidable. It would not be stretching matters too much for
the courts to recognize this potential right to recover the goods as
giving the seller at least a limited property right in them.'
Perhaps a better argument for an insurable interest could be based
on the contract right to the purchase price. While in some cases in
which a contract right has been held to be the basis for an insurable
interest in property the performances were dependent upon the con-
tinued existence of the property,u there are cases recognizing the
interest of the insured even though his contract rights would not have
been extinguished by the destruction of the insured property. 3 The
unpaid seller's contract right to the price might be impaired by
casualty to the goods. As was mentioned earlier, destruction of the
property, especially if it were not insured by the buyer, would reduce
the value of assets available for levy in case the claim was reduced
to judgment, and would also reduce the saleability of the claim.
Clearly and for the same reasons an insurable interest could be
found to exist on the broad basis that destruction of the property might
result in economic disadvantage to the insured seller, or, stated posi-
tively, the continued existence of the property would be economically
advantageous to the seller.
III. Tim BUYER'S INSURABLE INTEREST
A. Identified Goods
The Code specifically gives the buyer an insurable interest in goods
which are identified to the contract.M No other requirement for such
80. See WILLISTON, SALES §§ 10, 28, 40, 73, 273, 623 (rev. ed. 1948).
81. Cf. U.C.C. § 2-501(1).
82. For example in Graham v. Ins. Co. 48 S.C. 195, 26 S.E. 323 (1897), a super-
intendent was held to have an insurable interest in a factory in which he was to be
employed under a long term contract. It would seem that his right to employment was
contingent upon the continued existence of the factory. See also cases cited in note 10
supra.
83. See National Filtering Oil Co. v. Citizens Ins. Co., 106 N.Y. 535, 13 N.E. 337
(1887). See generally PATmEsoN, INsURANCE 115-16 (2d ed. 1957).
84. U.C.C. § 2-501(1).
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an interest exists. It is not necessary, for example, that the buyer have
title, risk of loss, or any other interest in the property. This insurable
interest exists even though the goods identified to the contract may
be non-conforming so as to justify the buyer in returning or rejecting
them.
85
Identification is the process by which goods are particularized or
designated as the goods to which the contract refers.86 The parties may
agree when identification is to take place. 7 However, as in the case of
passage of title and risk of loss, the Code contains specific rules to
determine when identification occurs if the parties have not "ex-
plicitly" agreed otherwise.88 Therefore, what is said below regarding
the problem of identification assumes that there is no contrary agree-
ment between the parties.
If the contract is for specific goods, identification occurs as soon
as the contract is made.8 For example, if Buyer and Seller contract to
buy and sell an original Van Gogh, identification occurs as soon as
the contract is made, and the buyer has an insurable interest at that
time.
As a general rule, if the contract is for the sale of future goods
identification occurs as soon as goods are in some way designated
or particularized by the seller as the goods to which the contract
refers. This particularization may be by shipment, marking or any
other action sufficient to show that these are the goods to which
the contract refers.90 For example, Seller contracts to sell Buyer one
thousand bushels of a described grade of wheat in sacks. A short time
later Seller sacks one thousand bushels of the described grade of
wheat. The wheat is segregated in Seller's warehouse and tagged
with Buyer's name and address. No doubt this would constitute an
identification and Buyer would have an insurable interest as soon
as the wheat is segregated and tagged. This would be true even
though the wheat sacked is defective or otherwise does not conform
with the terms of the contract.91
Special problems regarding identification are presented when the
parties contract to buy and sell growing crops or the unborn young of
animals. To cover these problems the drafters of the Code have in-
85. Ibid.
86. The code does not specifically define the term "identified;" however, throughout
article 2 it is used to describe the process stated in the text.
87. U.C.C. § 2-501(1).
88. Ibid.
89. U.C.C. § 2-501(1)(a).
0. U.C.C. § 2-501(1)(b). Future goods are described under the Code as "goods
which are not both existing and identified." U.C.C. § 2-105(2).
91. U.C.C. § 2-501(1).
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cluded a special provision.92 If the parties agree to buy and sell
growing crops, identification occurs as soon as the crop is planted,
provided it is to be harvested within twelve months or the next normal
harvest season after contracting, whichever is longer.93 Following are
several cases intended to illustrate the operation of this provision.
Case 1. On January 30, 1962, Seller contracts to sell Buyer all the
corn to be raised on a certain tract of land. Identification occurs when
the corn is planted on May 4, 1962, for the corn normally would be
harvested in the fall of 1962.
Case 2. The contract is made on January 30, 1962, for the sale of
corn to be raised on a certain tract during the 1963 season. Identifica-
tion would not occur under the provisions of the Code when the corn
is planted in the spring of 1963. This is because the corn is not to be
harvested within twelve months or the next normal harvest season
after the contract is made.
Case 3. A field of corn is planted in May, 1962, and on June 10,
1962, Seller contracts to sell all of the corn harvested from the field in
the fall at a stated price per bushel. Identification occurs as soon as
the contract is made.
Case 4. On February 4, 1963, Seller, a wholesale nurseryman, con-
tracts to sell Buyer, a retail nurseryman, one hundred Norway maples
for delivery in March, 1965. The maples are planted in April, 1963.
Identification occurs when the maples are planted if it would normally
take Norway maples at least two years to attain the growth necessary
for sale in retail trade.
In the case of contracts for the sale of the unborn young of animals
identification takes place as soon as the young are conceived, provided
birth will take place within twelve months after the contract is made. 4
Suppose for example, on July 2, 1962, Seller contracts to sell Buyer
the first foal to be born of a certain mare. The mare is bred a few days
later. Identification occurs at conception. The gestation period for
horses is eleven months, therefore, the foal would be born within
twelve months after the contract is made. If the mare had not been
bred until sometime in November, identification would not occur at
conception. The foal would not be born within twelve months after
the contract is made.
B. Analysis of Insurable Interest Based on Identification
As was mentioned earlier, identification of goods to the contract
gives the buyer an insurable interest even though he does not have
title or risk of loss. Identification under the Code gives the buyer a




special property in the goods.95 Traditionally the right of the buyer to
get possession of goods wrongfully withheld from him by the seller is
dependent upon showing either that title has passed96 or that the
goods are unique so that the legal remedy for damages would be
inadequatefs7 The right to recover the goods on the basis of title is
based on the theory that one who has title as owner, has a right to
possession unless he has given up this right by contract or otherwise.
So far as the buyer of goods is concerned article two of the Code
departs from this theory. The right of the buyer to replevy identified
goods in no way depends upon whether he has title. Instead, his right
to get possession of the goods usually is dependent upon his inability
to effect cover. 8 If he can effect cover he is not entitled to the goods
even though title has passed; if he cannot effect cover he is entitled
property interest in the goods in that subsequent inability to effect
to replevy goods identified to the contract even though title has not
passed. Thus under the Code identification gives the buyer a special
cover in case the seller wrongfully withholds possession entitles him
to maintain an action in replevin for possession.
This insurable interest seems to be based primarily on the property
right concept, but it could also be based on either the contract right
or economic disadvantage concept.
C. The Buyer's Insurable Interest in Unidentified Goods
The Code does not specifically give the buyer an insurable interest
in unidentified goods. Rather, this question is left up to other rules of
95. U.C.C. § 2-501(1).
96. See, e.g., Capitol Lumber Co. v. Mullinix, 208 Ala. 266, 94 So. 88 (1922);
Deutsch v. Dunham & Nelson, 72 Ark. 141, 78 S.W. 767 (1904); Rudin v. King-
Richardson Co., 311 IlI. 513, 143 N.E. 198 (1924); Wright v. Frank A. Andrews Co.,
212 Mass. 186, 98 N.E. 798 (1912); Chellis v. Grimes, 72 N.H. 104, 54 Atl. 943
(1903); Shaddon v. Knott, 32 Tenn. 358 (1852).
"Where the property in the goods has passed to the buyer and the seller wrongfully
neglects or refuses to deliver the goods, the buyer may maintain any action allowed
by law to the owner of goods of similar kind when wrongfully converted or withheld."
UNIFORM SALES AcT § 66. "Where the property in the goods has not passed to the
buyer, and the seller wrongfully neglects or refuses to deliver the goods, the buyer may
maintain an action against the seller for non-delivery." UNIFORM SALES AcT § 67(1).
97. For a collection of cases allowing specific performance of contracts for the sale
of goods see 3 WILLISTON, SALES § 602, at 328 nn.14-18, at 329 nn.1-3 (rev. ed. 1948).
98. U.C.C. § 2-716(3). This same section also gives him the right to replevy goods
shipped under reservation when satisfaction of the security interest in them has been
made or tendered.
Section 2-502 articulates a third circumstance under which the buyer may obtain
the goods. It provides that the buyer may recover goods identified to the contract
by paying or tendering payment of the unpaid portion of the purchase price if the
seller becomes insolvent within ten days after he receives the first installment of the
purchase price.
"Cover" means obtaining goods or contracting to obtain goods either identical with
those involved in the contract breached by the seller, or goods sufficiently similar to




law in the jurisdiction.99 While there is no authority on the question,
it is doubtful whether any jurisdiction, in the absence of statute, would
recognize such an interest. 100
While there are no cases on the point it seems basic that one cannot
have an insurable interest in goods not yet in existence. It is well
recognized, however, that one can effect a contract of insurance to
cover property once it does come into existence. 10' It is not improbable
that in some situations in which he contracts to purchase goods to be
manufactured or procured from others by the seller, the buyer may
wish to procure insurance to cover possible casualty to the goods once
they come into existence but before they are identified to the contract.
While it is true that in most instances casualty to the goods before
they have been identified to the contract would not excuse the seller
from his obligations,0 2 damages, even if collectable, might be totally
inadequate to compensate the buyer for his possible losses. This
would be especially true in output and requirement contracts where
the buyer's entire operation is dependent upon the proper supply of
goods from the seller, or in those situations in which the buyer has
made commitments for the resale of the goods to others.
There seems to be no reason why the buyer should not have an
insurable interest in such cases. There certainly would be no possi-
bility of a wager; instead a definite risk of loss exists which the buyer
should be allowed to shift to the insurer.
03
This conclusion is strengthened by the provisions of the Code deal-
ing with the buyer's right to specific performance of a sales contract. °4
99. U.C.C. § 2-501(3).
100. See 1 REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1955: Study of The
Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2, N.Y. Leg. Doc. 65(c) at 129-30 (1955).
A number of states have enacted statutes defining insurable interest in very broad
terms. The wording of the New York statute is typical: "The term 'insurable interest,'
as used in this section, shall be deemed to include any lawful and substantial economic
interest in the safety or preservation of property from loss, destruction or pecuniary
damage." N.Y. INS. LAW § 148. See PATTERSON, CASES ON INStrANCE 123-24 (3d ed.
1955), for a list of states with similar statutes. The New York Law Revision Com-
mission expressed the opinion that the language of the New York statute is broad
enough to give a buyer an insurable interest in unidentified goods. See 1 REPORT OF
THE LAW REVISION CoMvtssION FOR 1955: Study of The Uniform Commercial Code,
Article 2, op. cit. supra, at 129-30.
101. See VANCE, INSURANCE 176-79 (3d ed. 1951) and authorities cited.
102. U.C.C. §§ 2-613 and 2-615 provide for the situations tinder which casualty to
goods will excuse the seller from performance.
103. U.C.C. § 2-716(1) and comments 1 and 2.
104. "Specific performance is no longer limited to goods which are already specific
or ascertained at the time of contracting." U.C.C. § 2-716, comment 2.
During the post World War II period when new and used automobiles were in
extremely short supply, a number of cases were decided denying the buyer the right to
specific performance in contracts for the sale of automobiles. In some of these cases the
court relied upon the language of the Sales Act as a basis for refusing specific perform-
ance. Section 68 of the Sales Act provides: "Where the seller has broken a contract to
deliver specific or ascertained goods, a court having the powers of a court of equity
1964]
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These provisions make it clear that this remedy is no longer limited to
contracts for specific goods. 05 Evidently, the buyer under the proper
circumstances may get specific performance of a contract for goods
not yet identified to the contract. More importantly, so far as the
present problem is concerned, the concept of uniqueness has been
changed. 05 The traditional concept of what constitutes unique goods
has been limited to such things as original works of art, rare manu-
scripts, and family heirlooms. The Code repudiates this limited test
of uniqueness, and, in fact, suggests that "output and requirement
contracts involving a particular or peculiarly available source or
market present today the typical commercial specific performance
situation ..... 17 Even under this expanded concept of uniqueness
it is made clear that specific performance is not limited to situations
where the goods are unique. 08 In particular, the inability to purchase
similar goods elsewhere if the seller breaches evidently entitles the
buyer to specific performance even though no goods have been
identified to the contract at the time the breach occurred.
In view of these very broad and liberal provisions it seems especially
fitting that it should be recognized that the buyer has an insurable
interest in existing goods demonstrably intended for the particular
contract even though they have not yet been identified to the contract,
or, in the case of goods to be manufactured, even though they have
not been finished.10 9
may, if it thinks fit, on the application of the buyer, by its judgment or decree direct
that the contract shall be performed specifically, without giving the seller the option
of retaining the goods on payment of damages. The judgment or decree may be
unconditional, or upon such terms and conditions as to damages, payment of the price
and otherwise, as to the court may seem just." (Emphasis added.)
In a typical case in which the court denied specific performance under this section
of the Sales Act the parties had contracted for the sale of "one new car . . . make
Plymouth Type Sedan year 1946 color open." In the opinion the court stated: "The
language (Section 68) which is a codification of the common law . . . clearly implies
that the remedy of specific performance is available to the buyer of personal property
only when the goods are specific or ascertained .... ." Cohen v. Rosenstock, 188
Misc. 426, 427, 65 N.Y.S.2d 481, 482 (Sup. Ct. 1946). Evidently, it is this sort of
decision which the drafters of the code seek to avoid.
In similar fact situations other courts have granted specific performance. See DeMoss
v. Conort Motor Sales, 149 Ohio St. 299, 72 N.E.2d 158, aff'd, 78 N.E.2d 675 (1948).
105. U.C.C. § 2-716, comment 2.
106. U.C.C. § 2-716, comment 2.
107. Ibid.
108. U.C.C. § 2-716(1) and comment 2. Comment 2 states in part: "However,
uniqueness is not the sole basis of the remedy under this section for the relief may
also be granted 'in other proper circumstances' and inability to cover is strong evidence
of 'other proper circumstances."' (Emphasis added.)
109. It is well recognized that expected profits in a venture may be insured. See
PA=rSEsoN, op. cit. supra note 83, at 135-37 and cases cited. In most cases in which
the buyer insured against loss of profits in a sales transaction, it appears likely that




A. The Seller's Insurable Interest
The provisions of the Code regarding the seller's insurable interest
add nothing to prior law. Case law already recognizes that the seller
has an insurable interest in goods to which he has title or in which he
has a security interest. Divorce of risk of loss from title provides
several possible situations in which the seller does not have title but
does bear the risk of loss. In some of the situations he would still
have possession, which would under many circumstances give him a
security interest by virtue of his possessory lien. In others, however,
he could have risk of loss, but neither title nor a security interest. In
this latter type situation any insurable interest is dependent upon
rules of law other than those found in the Code. While a court
certainly should find an insurable interest on the basis of risk of loss
alone, existing law is tied to the general concept that risk of loss
generally follows title, and would be doubtful authority for the
proposition that risk of loss alone gives the seller an insurable
interest.
In still other situations in which both title and risk of loss have
passed to the buyer, the seller might still be in possession of the
goods, but if the buyer has performed all of his obligations under
the contract, there would be no security interest in the seller. Again,
the extent of the seller's insurable interest must be determined by
other rules of law. In such a case he is holding the goods as bailee
for the buyer, and even though risk of loss has passed is under a duty
to exercise a certain standard of care in the custody of the goods.
Insurable interest could easily be based on his potential legal liability
to the buyer. Under the Code, however, it is not clear whether in
such a case the seller holds the goods as bailee for the buyer. The
buyer's right to possession is qualified; if the seller withholds the
goods the buyer must show that he cannot effect cover in order to
replevy them. Does this mean that there is no bailee-bailor relationship
until it can be shown that cover cannot be effected, or is there a bailee-
bailor relationship subject to dissolution if the buyer is able to cover?
The Code does not give an answer. In any case, possession alone
should give the seller an insurable interest. If the buyer cannot get
The New York Law Revision Commission in discussing the question of the buyer's in-
surable interest in unidentified goods concluded: "However, it would be possible to argue
that insurance of the foregoing interests relate only to 'contracts' and the Code's rules on
the insurability of 'goods' are wholly inapplicable. This interpretation would be
consistent with the probable intent of the Code to liberalize rather than to restrict the
area of insurability. It is less than certain, however, that this contention would be
accepted; in any event, litigation would probably be necessary to fix the scope of the
Code provision." 1 REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION CoMMIssION FOR 1955: Study of
The Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2, op. cit. supra note 100, at 130.
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possession the seller is for all practical purposes the owner. If the
buyer would be entitled to possession there is potential legal liability
by the seller if the goods are damaged because of his failure to
exercise the proper degree of care regarding them. Also he would
be entitled to possession as against any one except the buyer and this
alone should provide sufficient basis for an insurable interest.
The point is, however, that insurable interest in such cases is left by
the Code to other rules of law. Why leave these questions open,
especially when some traditional concepts upon which insurable
interest has been held to depend have themselves been changed by
the Code? The drafters could have removed all doubt by recognizing
expressly that the seller has an insurable interest so long as he has
title, risk of loss, a security interest, or possession.
It is not known whether the drafters considered the problem of
the unsecured seller's insurable interest in goods delivered to the
buyer on which the full purchase price has not been paid. As this is
really a part of a larger problem of the creditor's insurable interest in
his debtor's property, perhaps it is sounder to have the solution to this
problem depend upon the general law of the jurisdiction.
B. The Buyer's Insurable Interest
The provision giving the buyer an insurable interest as soon as the
goods are identified is in line with the policy of divorcing the buyer's
right to replevy identified goods from passage of title. Identification
creates a special property in the buyer and certainly, therefore, should
give him an insurable interest.
The drafters did not see fit to deal with the question of the buyer's
insurable interest in existing but unidentified goods. In most juris-
dictions other rules of law would probably not sustain such an interest.
For the reasons indicated above such an interest should have been
recognized.
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